View Full Version : Surging To Defeat In Iraq W. Patrick Lang and Ray McGovern
Surging To Defeat In Iraq
W. Patrick Lang and Ray McGovern
December 18, 2006
W. Patrick Lang is a retired Army colonel who served with Special Forces in Vietnam, as an instructor at West Point, and as Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East. Ray McGovern was also an Army infantry/intelligence officer before his 27-year career as a CIA analyst. Both are with Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).
As Robert Gates takes the helm at the Pentagon today, he is probably already aware that Vice President Dick Cheney and President George W. Bush are resolute in their decision to stay the course in Iraq (without using those words) for the next two years. What he probably does not realize is that the U.S. military is about to commit hara-kiri.
The media are abuzz with trial balloons with official leaks that President George W. Bush is about to approve a “surge” in U.S. troop strength in Iraq by tens of thousands. At the same time, surge advocate Sen. Lindsay Graham, R-S.C., just back from a brief visit to the Green Zone with fellow surgers John McCain, R-Ariz., and Joe Lieberman, D-Conn., has warned that “the amount of troops will make no difference” if Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki avoids taking “bold” moves. The three pretend to be unaware that the most important move for which they pressed—breaking with radical Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr—would amount to political suicide for Maliki.
Meanwhile, back at the Sunday talk shows, incoming Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., who owes his position to the popular revolt in November against the war, said he can “go along” with a surge, but only for two to three months and only as part of a broader strategy to bring combat forces home by early 2008. Meanwhile, says Reid, Democrats will “give the military anything they want.”
Can Reid be oblivious to the reality that this has to do with the next two years—not the next two months? Former Army vice chief of staff Gen. Jack Keane, one of the anointed retired generals who have Bush’s ear, is urging him to send 30,000 to 40,000 more troops and has already dismissed the possibility of a time-frame shorter than one and a half years. What seems clear is that the president is determined that the war not be lost while he is in office. But events are moving too fast for that. It was not quite the way he meant it, but Bush has gotten one thing right; there will indeed be no “graceful exit.” That goes in spades, if he sends still more troops.
Oxymoron
A generation from now, our grandchildren will have difficulty writing history papers on this oxymoronic debate on how to surge/withdraw our troops into/from the quagmire in Iraq. Historians will have just as much trouble, especially those given to Tolstoy’s theory that history is ruled by an inexorable determinism in which the free choice of major historical figures plays a minimal role. Tolstoy died before events put into perspective the legacy of Tsar Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat [Decider] Of All The Russias, and his Vice President/éminence grise, Rasputin.
Judging from President Bush’s behavior in recent weeks, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that he may be no more stable than Nicholas II. And if retired Col. Larry Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s top aide at the State Department, is right in saying that Bush still has the “vice president whispering in his ear every moment,” we have an unhappy but apt historical analogy.
But, you protest, the generals most intimately involved in Iraq, John Abizaid and George Casey, and Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker have made no secret of their strong reservations about sending large numbers of additional troops. That is correct, but also irrelevant. Because, as was the case in the Vietnam War, our top generals have long since morphed into careerists and politicians. They have become accustomed to looking up for the next reward—and not down at the troops who bear the brunt of their acquiescence in political/military decisions that make no sense.
But what about Senators Joe Biden and Ted Kennedy—and Colin Powell, and even Donald Rumsfeld, all of whom spoke out yesterday against a sizable surge in troop strength in Iraq? No problem. Cheney/Bush is the sole “decider.”
This does not mean that Defense Secretary Robert Gates should renege on his promise to visit the troops in Iraq and hear the generals out. It does mean that by the time he gets there, the generals can be expected to be already “on board with the program,” as they say. And taking issue with “deciders” has never been Gates’ strong suit.
What Gates may not realize, but the generals should, is that once an “all or nothing” offensive like the “surge” contemplated has begun, there is no turning back. It will be “victory” over the insurgents and the Shia militias or palpable defeat, recognizable by all in Iraq and across the world.
Stalingrad on the Tigris
A “surge” of the size possible under current constraints on U.S. forces will not turn the tide in the guerrilla war. Reinforcement of Bagdad several thousand U.S. troops last summer simply brought on more violence. Those who believe still more troops will bring “victory” are living in a dangerous dream world and need to wake up.
Moreover, major reinforcement would commit the US Army and Marine Corps to decisive combat in which there are no more strategic reserves to be sent to the front. It will be a matter of win or die in the attempt. In that situation, everyone in uniform on the ground will commit every ounce of their being to a hope of “victory,” and few measures will be shrunk from.
Analogies come to mind: the Bulge, Stalingrad, the Battle of Algiers. It will be total war with all the likelihood of excesses and mass casualties that come with total war.
To take up such a strategy and force our armed forces into it would be an immoral course of action, both for our troops and for the thousands more Iraqis bound to die.
Sen. Gordon Smith, R-Ore., spoke for many of us last Thursday on the Senate floor:
“I, for one, am at the end of my rope when it comes to supporting a policy that has our soldiers patrolling the same streets in the same way, being blown up by the same bombs day after day. That is absurd. It may even be criminal. I cannot support that anymore.”
Yesterday, when George Stephanopoulos asked Smith what he meant by “criminal,” he replied:
“I said it. You can use any adjective you want, George. But I have long believed in a military context, when you do the same thing over and over again, without a clear strategy for victory, at the expense of your young people in arms, that is dereliction. That is deeply immoral.”
If adopted, the “surge” strategy will be even worse than that. It will be something we will spend a generation living down.
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/12/18/surging_to_defeat_in_iraq.php
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This has already turned into a financial Stalingrad.
The plans for a "surge" and the demand, as the neoncons and their conservative media allies so loudly put it, "to choose victory instead of retreat" remind me of what the unidentified White House staffer told Ron Perelman in a NY Times magazine article about two years ago, as the staffer boasted about the power of the White House and Bush administration(a rough paraphrase from my memory):
You people are in the reality based community. Well, while you guys are trying to figure that out, we are creating our own reality...and by the time you've figured out what we've done, we've moved on to the next phase...
Looks like they're creating their own reality, big time, in the "surge" plan. A huge reinforcement, a big battle, several thousand casualties on both sides, followed by a declaration of "victory" and "progress." Then what? More of the same?
Incredibly, unless someone finds Harry Reid's balls and gives them back to him, the Democrats - those "anti-war" Democrats - are going to roll over for this.
dubeaux
dubeaux,
I remember that. Here's some more Lang complete with the "Kagan plan", also known as "Operation Warsaw", for that is what they will have to do.
Stalingrad on the Tigris?
Below you will find a Power Point (what else?) presentation on the recent AEI analytic meeting run by one of the Kagans. The cast of contributers at the end reads very much like one of the great neocon "papers" done up before their return to power under Bush 41'. I have in mind the "Clean Break" paper which contained so much of "future history. The military men listed among the supposed authors are a mystery to me. I know who some of them are but I question how much they really understood what was going to be said in their names.
The paper urges a "surge" of many thousands more US troops into Baghdad beginning in March, 2007 for one more grand roll of the iron dice. The concept seems to be based on the notion that Shia militias exist because of Sunni violence against them rather than as expressions of a Shia drive to political dominance in Iraq. Based on that belief the authors seem to believe that if the additional US and Iraqi forces to be employed in the Capital area defeat (destroy?) the Sunni insurgent groups, then the Shia militia armies will "wither away" from a lack of need. I do not think that belief is justified.
The authors assert that contrary to General Schoomaker's appraisal below in"State of the Army," such a surge will not "break the Army."
They also assert that with an increase in recruiting the brigades that would be missing from the present rotation queue because of this "surge" could be replaced with the one year or so period of the 'surge.' I doubt that this is a realistic appraisal of how long such a process of unit creation would take.
One of the "implied" tasks to be accomplished by the "surged" force would be to disarm the Mahdi's Army and the other Shia militias. The authors seem unclear as to whether or not the militias will fight to avoid being disarmed. In my judgment it will be impossible to conduct an enlarged anti-insurgent campaign in Baghdad without engaging the Mahdi militia. They think that they "own" the place and will not be quiescent.
This concept is a recipe for a grandand climactic battle of attrition between US and Iraqi forces on one side and the some combination of Sunni and Shia forces on the other. The Sunnis and Shia would not necessarily "ally" themselves to each other, but a general co-belligerence against our people would be bad enough.
President Bush may well accept the essence of this concept. He wants to redeem his "freedom agenda," restore momentum to his plans and in his mind this might "clear up" Iraq so that he could move on to Iran.
The carnage implicit in this concept would be appalling. The authors have much to say about the consequences of defeat in Iraq, but, I wonder if they have contemplated what it would be like to fail in their climactic battle and still be required by '43 to stay in Iraq. pl
Download 200612141_choosingvictory6.pdf (http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/files/200612141_choosingvictory6.pdf)
The Kagan in question is Frederick, a person who teaches military science at West Point. He shouldn't be allowed near cadets.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2006/12/stalingrad_on_t.html
The White House that makes reality and Bring In On Bush has turned into, "Do you have any ideas? I don't know, do you know?"
The real story is the Neo's. This is what they wanted allalong, chaos in Iraq, and if they could have pulled off, chaos in Syria and Iran. And if Americans have to pay fifteen dollars a gallon at the pump, so be it.
They're backing out, now, because they don't want / never wanted success.
Sertorius, you always have the most interesting sources, i/c many I've never heard of, which add depth to the discussions here. Thanks!
One of the most appalling things about the "surge" proposal is, that as soon as it was run up the flagpole by AEI virtually every active "conservative" pundit (not merely the card-carrying neocons) saluted it. And repeated, verbatim, the talking points they were apparently given on an index card by Danielle Pletka (the well known female Clausewitz who is listed as one of the authors of "Choosing Victory," along w/a latter day Boadicea named Kimberly Kagan, presumably a distaff member of the Kagan gang).
In other words, except for paleocons like Pat Buchanan, there is NO conservative viewpoint in foreign policy left; it is now a wholly owned branch of Neocon Inc. and the Likud Party.
Remarkable also is the massive carpet bombing the right-wing media has done against the Baker-Hamilton report, the credibility of which has been almost totally destroyed.
A carpet bombing, I suppose, to pound flat any opposition to "Choosing Victory," the "surge," and a big expansion in the war. The Democrats have obviously been intimidated by this; indeed, they are like German soldiers, dazed and confused by Allied bombers at the beginning of Operation Cobra in Normandy.
...The Kagan in question is Frederick, a person who teaches military science at West Point. He shouldn't be allowed near cadets.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2006/12/stalingrad_on_t.html
Yes. I do have a proposal for a Kagan post-doctorate fellowship: drop him by parachute into the Sadr City section of Baghdad, for a seminar in "ground truth" versus ideology. If he survives he might even have something worth putting on PowerPoint, for a change.
dubeaux
dubeaux,
Thanks. I figure the person who wrote the power point presentation was Kagan. Most of these names I recognize as the fools that came up with this stupid plan to invade Iraq in the first place. Why in the hell anyone save for a bought and paid for member of neocon talk radio and Fox would pay any attention to these folks is beyond me. Instead, I see a concerted effort to blame those who were against the war to begin with being responsible for the level of violence that is ocurring there, as if the Iraqi resistance has time to watch US tv and listen to US radio. What a crock.
I don't see how they can make this work without leveling the city like Warsaw in 1944. Of course, that is what some of them want to do.
On another note, I see Bush wants to increase the size of the Army and Marines. Too late! He should have done that years ago. He might try to change the regulations regarding the use of the reserves and national guard so as to send them back sooner.
I don't see how they can make this work without leveling the city like Warsaw in 1944. Of course, that is what some of them want to do.
Yep. I think it's possible a large force of American soldiers and Marines can pacify some parts of Baghdad, for a limited time. The "surge" proponents are saying that this will be enough, that Iraqis will be inspired by even a modest decline in the violence, which will suddenly cause them to become active supporters of the government, weaken and make irrelevent the militias, and inspire the Iraqi army to become combat-effective.
Uh-huh.
It's clearly the product of vastly over-simplified, academic thinking, not a careful appreciation of the incredible complexity of the problem.
Which is why it will fail, if we try it.
...He might try to change the regulations regarding the use of the reserves and national guard so as to send them back sooner.
Apparently he already has the authority to send in NG and reserves into a "surge" fight. The attitude of the Democrats on this issue will be important, however; they could make trouble for W if they had the nerve.
But indications are they will let Bush do what he wants. I watched Biden on C-span Sunday, and he answered an audience question about trying to stop a "surge" by declaring it was the responsibility of Republicans in congress, not the democrats, to restrain Bush. Democrats are terrified the right-wing media will succeed in blaming them for "losing Iraq" if they oppose the "surge."
Very ominous.
dubeaux
dubeaux,
It's clearly the product of vastly over-simplified, academic thinking, not a careful appreciation of the incredible complexity of the problem.
That reminds me of something Kagan wrote around 2000. In one of his innumeral columns on why we needed to invade Iraq he wrote that one modern day US division was worth six WW II US divisions. I thought to myself "apples and oranges." While a case could be made in terms of firepower, it falls apart in terms of numbers that can be used to hold terrain. I bet Kagan figured our force of around four divisions used in the original invasion was really the equivilent of 24. We probably would have been better off if they had been WW II divisions, in view of all the looting that occured, particularly of the ammo dumps and arms rooms.
That reminds me of something Kagan wrote around 2000. In one of his innumeral columns on why we needed to invade Iraq he wrote that one modern day US division was worth six WW II US divisions. I thought to myself "apples and oranges." While a case could be made in terms of firepower, it falls apart in terms of numbers that can be used to hold terrain. I bet Kagan figured our force of around four divisions used in the original invasion was really the equivilent of 24. We probably would have been better off if they had been WW II divisions, in view of all the looting that occured, particularly of the ammo dumps and arms rooms.
Damn good example of academic thinking getting us into real world difficulty.
It's interesting to observe how the expression of child-like faith in the magical efficacy of superior technology, such as extolling the supremely stupid "Revolution in Military Affairs," has largely vanished from the conservative media.
dubeaux
Damn good example of academic thinking getting us into real world difficulty.
It's interesting to observe how the expression of child-like faith in the magical efficacy of superior technology, such as extolling the supremely stupid "Revolution in Military Affairs," has largely vanished from the conservative media.
dubeaux
In an indirect way, the neocon jewsade is actually starting to learn what you've pointed out. They keep mentioning the need for more "boots on the ground", a term I abhor since it's used by so many chickenhawks in a manner similar to "meat on the hoof". (What if I said we needed "more skirts in the workplace" to handle all the paperwork?)
Nevertheless, the "boots on the ground" (ugh!) reference is always used to rhetorically bemoan the lack of sufficient goyen soldiery immediately necessary.
It has to be noticeable to enough Americans that us Cold Warriors were considered evil baby killers in the days our military stared down judeo-bolshevist expansion but the military is today considered acceptable because it fights israel's enemies.
dubeaux,
Even with all the problems they have, they still haven't given up on the insane idea of attacking Iran. Here's another proposal by a Kaganite from Norman Podhoretz's Commentary magazine. I've highlighted the actual plan in bold if you don't wish to wade through all of this crap. I swear, the worst things get over there, the crazier the Neocons become. These people are insane.
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Getting Serious About Iran:
A Military Option
By Arthur Herman From issue: November 2006
As the impasse over Iran’s nuclear-weapons program grows inexorably into a crisis, a kind of consensus has taken root in the minds of America’s foreign-policy elite. This is that military action against Iran is a sure formula for disaster. The essence of the position was expressed in a cover story in Time magazine this past September. Entitled “What War with Iran Would Look Like (And How to Avoid It),” the essay focused on what the editors saw as the certain consequences of armed American intervention in that country: wildly spiking oil prices, increased terrorist attacks, economic panic around the world, and the end to any dream of pro-American democratic governments emerging in the Middle East. And that would be in the case of successful action. In fact, Time predicted, given our overstretched resources and an indubitably fierce Iranian resistance, we would almost certainly lose.
Thus, in the eyes of Time’s experts as of many other observers, military action against Iran is “unthinkable.” What then can be done in the face of the mullahs’ implacable drive to acquire nuclear weapons? Here a variety of responses can be discerned. At one end are those who assure us, in the soothing title of a New York Times op-ed by Barry Posen of MIT, that “We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran.” (Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria is similarly sanguine.) Others, like Senator Joseph Biden, insist that we have at least ten years before we have to worry about Iran’s getting a working bomb. According to Ashton Carter, who served as an assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, we at least have enough time to explore every possible diplomatic avenue before contemplating any direct military response.
Taking a more openly appeasing line, critics of the Bush administration like Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations and Chatham House’s Ali Ansari urge us to enter into extended engagement or “dialogue” with Iran, with an eye toward persuading the mullahs to end or at least to modify their nuclear program. This is essentially the tack that has been followed by European and European Union diplomats for the past three years, with notably little success.
Finally there is the tougher solution preferred by the Bush administration: economic sanctions imposed by the UN. The problem here is that the more effective such sanctions are designed to be—proposed measures include freezing Iranian assets abroad and suspending all business and financial ties—the more reluctant have been France, Russia, and China (our partners on the Security Council) to go along. Sanctions that do pass muster with these governments, whose aggregate business dealings with Iran far outstrip those of the United States, are precisely the ones with little or no bite.
And even watered-down sanctions, as U.S. Ambassador John Bolton admitted in a recent interview, are “by no means a done deal.”
To a greater or lesser extent, all of these recommendations fly in the face of reality. Despite Iran’s richly developed repertoire of denials, deceptions, and dissimulations, there is ample evidence that it has no intention whatsoever of relinquishing its aim of becoming a nuclear power. Moreover, this aim may be achievable not within a decade (as Senator Biden fancies) but within the next two to three years. In September, the House Intelligence Committee reported that Iran may have already succeeded in enriching uranium; some intelligence analysts believe that it may already have access to fissionable nuclear material, courtesy of North Korea. If that is so, no diplomacy in the world is going to prevent it from acquiring a bomb.
But neither are nuclear weapons the only threat posed by the Islamic Republic. While the international community has been preoccupied with this issue, the regime in Tehran has been taking steady steps to achieve hegemony over one of the world’s most sensitive and economically critical regions, and control over the world’s most precious resource. It is doing so, moreover, entirely through conventional means.
To put it briefly, the Islamic Republic has its hand on the throttle of the world’s economic engine: the stretch of ocean at the mouth of the Persian Gulf known as the Straits of Hormuz, which are only 21 miles wide at their narrowest point. Through this waterway, every day, pass roughly 40 percent of the world’s crude oil, including two-thirds of the oil from Saudi Arabia. By 2025, according to Energy Department estimates, fully 60 percent of the world’s oil exports will be moved through this vital chokepoint.
The Straits border on Iran and Oman, with the two lanes of traffic that are used specifically by oil tankers being theoretically protected by international agreement. Since 9/11, a multinational force comprising ships from the U.S., Japan, six European countries, and Pakistan have patrolled outside the Straits, in Omani waters, to make sure they stay open. But this is largely a token force. Meanwhile, the world’s access to Saudi, Qatari, Kuwaiti, and Iraqi oil and gas, as well as other petroleum products from the United Arab Emirates, depends on free passage through the Hormuz Straits.
The Tehran regime has made no secret of its desire to gain control of the Straits as part of its larger strategy of turning the Gulf into an Iranian lake. Indeed, in a preemptive move, it has begun to threaten a cut-off of tanker traffic if the UN should be foolish enough to impose sanctions in connection with the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. “We have the power to halt oil supply,” a senior Iranian official warned the European Union last January, “down to the last drop.”
In April of this year, as if to drive the point home, Iranian armed forces staged elaborate war games in the Gulf, test-firing a series of new anti-ship missiles capable of devastating any tanker or unwary warship. In the boast of one Iranian admiral, April’s “Holy Prophet war games” showed what could be expected by anyone daring to violate Iran’s interests in the Gulf. A further demonstration of resolve occurred in August, when Iran fired on and then occupied a Rumanian-owned oil platform ostensibly in a dispute over ownership rights; in truth, the action was intended to show Western companies—including Halliburton, which had won a contract for constructing facilities in the Gulf—exactly which power is in charge there.
A 30-page document said to issue from the Strategic Studies Center of the Iranian Navy (NDAJA), and drawn up in September or October of last year, features a contingency plan for closing the Hormuz Straits through a combination of anti-ship missiles, coastal artillery, and submarine attacks. The plan calls for the use of Chinese-made mines, Chinese-built missile boats, and more than 1,000 explosive-packed suicide motor boats to decimate any U.S. invasion force before it can so much as enter the Gulf. Iran’s missile units, manned by the regime’s Revolutionary Guards, would be under instruction to take out more than 100 targets around the Gulf rim, including Saudi production and export centers.
The authenticity of the NDAJA document has been vouched for by at least two defectors from Iranian intelligence. Of course, it may not be authentic at all. And military contingency plans are just that—contingency plans; the file cabinets of defense ministries around the world are full of them. Nor do all analysts agree that the Straits of Hormuz can be effectively mined in the first place. Nevertheless, even the threat of mines or suicide boats would likely be enough to induce Lloyds of London to suspend insurance of ships passing through the Straits, causing tanker traffic to cease, oil markets to rise precipitously, and Asian and European economies to reel.
Something like this very nearly happened in 1987 during the Iran-Iraq war, when only direct U.S. intervention kept the Straits open and the world’s oil flowing. For the United States is hardly the only country with a stake in keeping the Gulf and Straits free of Iranian control. Every country in Western Europe and Asia, including those that complain most bitterly about American policy in the Middle East, depends on the steady maintenance of the global economic order that runs on Middle Eastern oil.
But—and herein lies a fruitful irony—so does Iran itself. Almost 90 percent of the mullahs’ oil assets are located either in or near the Gulf. So is the nuclear reactor that Russia is building for Iran at Bushehr. Virtually every Iranian well or production platform depends on access to the Gulf if Iran’s oil is to reach buyers. Hence, the same Straits by means of which Iran intends to lever itself into a position of global power present the West with its own point of leverage to reduce Iran’s power—and to keep it reduced for at least as long as the country’s political institutions remain unprepared to enter the modern world.
Which brings us back to the military option. That there is plentiful warrant for the exercise of this option—in Iran’s serial defiance of UN resolutions, in its declared genocidal intentions toward Israel, another member of the United Nations, and in the fact of its harboring, supporting, and training of international terrorists—could not be clearer. Unfortunately, though, current debate has become stuck on the issue of possible air strikes against Iran’s nuclear program, and whether such strikes can or cannot halt that program’s further development. Optimists argue they can; pessimists, including those highlighted in Time’s cover story, throw up a myriad of objections.
The most common such objection is that the ayatollahs, having learned the lesson of 25 years ago when Israel took out Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor at Osirak, have dispersed the most vital elements of their uranium-enrichment project among perhaps 30 hardened and well-protected sites. According to Time’s military sources, air sorties would thus have to reach roughly 1,500 “aim points,” contending with sophisticated air-defense systems along the way. As against this, others, including the strategic analyst Edward Luttwak in Commentary (“Three Reasons Not to Bomb Iran—Yet,” May 2006), argue convincingly that it is hardly necessary to hit all or even the majority of Iran’s sites in order to set back its nuclear program by several years.
But, as I have tried to show, the most immediate menace Iran poses is not nuclear but conventional in nature. How might it be dealt with militarily, and is it conceivable that both perils could be dealt with at once? What follows is one possible scenario for military action.
The first step would be to make it clear that the United States will tolerate no action by any state that endangers the international flow of commerce in the Straits of Hormuz. Signaling our determination to back up this statement with force would be a deployment in the Gulf of Oman of minesweepers, a carrier strike group’s guided-missile destroyers, an Aegis-class cruiser, and anti-submarine assets, with the rest of the carrier group remaining in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. Navy could also deploy UAV’s (unmanned air vehicles) and submarines to keep watch above and below against any Iranian missile threat to our flotilla.
Our next step would be to declare a halt to all shipments of Iranian oil while guaranteeing the safety of tankers carrying non-Iranian oil and the platforms of other Gulf states. We would then guarantee this guarantee by launching a comprehensive air campaign aimed at destroying Iran’s air-defense system, its air-force bases and communications systems, and finally its missile sites along the Gulf coast. At that point the attack could move to include Iran’s nuclear facilities—not only the “hard” sites but also infrastructure like bridges and tunnels in order to prevent the shifting of critical materials from one to site to another.
Above all, the air attack would concentrate on Iran’s gasoline refineries. It is still insufficiently appreciated that Iran, a huge oil exporter, imports nearly 40 percent of its gasoline from foreign sources, including the Gulf states. With its refineries gone and its storage facilities destroyed, Iran’s cars, trucks, buses, planes, tanks, and other military hardware would run dry in a matter of weeks or even days. This alone would render impossible any major countermoves by the Iranian army. (For its part, the Iranian navy is aging and decrepit, and its biggest asset, three Russian-made Kilo-class submarines, should and could be destroyed before leaving port.)
The scenario would not end here. With the systematic reduction of Iran’s capacity to respond, an amphibious force of Marines and special-operations forces could seize key Iranian oil assets in the Gulf, the most important of which is a series of 100 offshore wells and platforms built on Iran’s continental shelf. North and South Pars offshore fields, which represent the future of Iran’s oil and natural-gas industry, could also be seized, while Kargh Island at the far western edge of the Persian Gulf, whose terminus pumps the oil from Iran’s most mature and copiously producing fields (Ahwaz, Marun, and Gachsaran, among others), could be rendered virtually useless. By the time the campaign was over, the United States military would be in a position to control the flow of Iranian oil at the flick of a switch.
An operational fantasy? Not in the least. The United States did all this once before, in the incident I have already alluded to. In 1986-88, as the Iran-Iraq war threatened to spill over into the Gulf and interrupt vital oil traffic, the United States Navy stepped in, organizing convoys and re-flagging ships to protect them against vengeful Iranian attacks. When the Iranians tried to seize the offensive, U.S. vessels sank one Iranian frigate, crippled another, and destroyed several patrol boats. Teams of SEALS also shelled and seized Iranian oil platforms. The entire operation, the largest naval engagement since World War II, not only secured the Gulf; it also compelled Iraq and Iran to wind down their almost decade-long war. Although we made mistakes, including most grievously the accidental shooting-down of a civilian Iranian airliner, killing everyone on board, the world economic order was saved—the most important international obligation the United States faced then and faces today.
But the so-called “tanker war” did not go far enough. In the ensuing decades, the regime in Tehran has single-mindedly pursued its goal of achieving great-power status through the acquisition of nuclear weapons, control of the Persian Gulf, and the spread of its ideology of global jihad. Any effective counter-strategy today must therefore be predicated not only on seizing the state’s oil assets but on refusing to relinquish them unless and until there is credible evidence of regime change in Tehran or—what is all but inconceivable—a major change of direction by the reigning theocracy. In the meantime, and as punishment for its serial violations of UN resolutions and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran’s oil resources would be impounded and revenues from their production would be placed in escrow.
Obviously, no plan is foolproof. The tactical risks associated with a comprehensive war strategy of this sort are numerous. But they are outweighed by its key advantages.
First, it would accomplish much more than air strikes alone on Iran’s elusive nuclear sites. Whereas such action might retard the uranium-enrichment program by some years, this one in effect would put Iran’s theocracy out of business by depriving it of the very weapon that the critics of air strikes most fear. It would do so, moreover, with minimal means. This would be a naval and air war, not a land campaign. Requiring no draw-down of U.S. forces in Iraq, it would involve one or two carrier strike groups, an airborne brigade, and a Marine brigade. Since the entire operation would take place offshore, there would be no need to engage the Iranian army. It and the Revolutionary Guards would be left stranded, out of action and out of gas.
In fact, there is little Iran could do in the face of relentless military pressure at its most vulnerable point. Today, not only are key elements of the Iranian military in worse shape than in the 1980’s, but even the oil weapon is less formidable than imagined. Currently Iran exports an estimated 2.5 million barrels of oil a day. Yet according to a recent report in Forbes, quoting the oil-industry analyst Michael Lynch, new sources of oil around the world will have boosted total production by 2 million barrels a day in this year alone, and next year by three million barrels a day. In short, other producers (including Iranian platforms in American hands) can take up some if not all of the slack. The real loser would be Iran itself. Pumping crude oil is its only industry, making up 85 percent of its exports and providing 65 percent of the state budget. With its wells held hostage, the country’s economy could enter free fall.
To be sure, none of these considerations is likely to impress those who object in principle to any decisive action against Iran’s mullahs. To some, the scenario I have proposed will seem just another instance of rampant American imperialism or “gunboat diplomacy.” To others, a war of this kind will surely appear calculated further to inflame anti-Americanism in the Middle East, arousing the fury of the dreaded “Arab street.” Still others will point with alarm to the predictably angry reaction of Iran’s two great patrons, Russia and China. And many will worry that decisive U.S. action will boomerang politically, by alienating Iran’s democrats and dissidents and thus jeopardizing the hoped-for eventuality of a pro-Western government emerging in Tehran.
Let me address these concerns in turn. In the colonial era, gunboats were used to intimidate helpless peoples, not countries bent on intimidation themselves and actively underwriting global terrorism. Nor does America’s immediate self-interest, “imperial” or otherwise, enter the picture; it is Europeans and Asians, not Americans, who rely on Iranian oil and natural gas. By safeguarding that supply, and keeping the Hormuz Straits open to other shippers, we can prevent a world-wide crisis of the sort that might well be triggered by Tehran itself in the face of economic sanctions or air strikes against its nuclear sites. Predictably, those complaining the loudest about American “imperialism” would be its most direct beneficiaries.
As for anti-Americanism in general, the specter of the Arab street has proved itself to be a chimera. If the forcible removal of an Arab dictator (Saddam Hussein) failed to produce the incendiary reaction predicted by many experts, war on a non-Arab regime is hardly likely to do so. To the contrary, it is by dragging out the crisis, and by appearing weak in the face of Tehran’s blustering and deception, that we help to consolidate the formation of a radical Shiite Crescent in the heart of the Middle East. By finally removing the head of the radical Islamic monster, the military campaign contemplated here would perform a service both for neighboring Sunni regimes and for moderate Shiites in search of political breathing room, even as groups like Hizballah in Lebanon and Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia in Iraq would begin to find themselves politically and militarily orphaned and incapable of concerted action.
Then there are Moscow and Beijing. What these two regimes want out of Iran is a return on their investments there—and, in China’s case, oil. No doubt their first choice would be to have everything stay the way it is; but clearly their second choice is to prevent Iran itself from becoming the dominant player in the region. By ensuring a continuous flow of oil from the Gulf, and leaving untouched Russian and Chinese investments in the development of Iran’s Caspian Sea fields, an aggressive military strategy could actually work to those countries’ advantage.
Would U.S. action permanently traumatize Iranian national pride and alienate its democrats for generations to come? This is the worry of analysts like Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute, who on these same grounds also opposes air strikes on Iran’s nuclear installations. If anything, however, the current American policy—namely, pursuing economic sanctions—would seem likelier to produce that long-term damaging effect than would a short, sharp war to neutralize and perhaps even to topple a hated regime.
That the regime in Tehran is indeed hated, and also radically unstable, is a point on which both advocates and opponents of American action can agree. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that Iran is rent by ethnic divisions and rivalries almost as fierce as those that divide Iraq or such former Soviet republics as Georgia and Russia itself. Almost half of Iran’s population is made up of Kurds, Baluchis, Azeris, Arabs, and Turkomans. Unlike the Persians, who are Shiites, most of these minorities are Sunni. Thus, Iran is a country ripe for constitutional overhaul, if not re-federation. Unless the current regime and its backers are willing to change course, decisive military action could open the way for an entirely new Iran.
The key word is “decisive.” What has cost us prestige in the Middle East and around the world is not our 2003 invasion of Iraq but our lack of a clear record of success in its aftermath. Governments in and around the Persian Gulf region are waiting for someone to deal effectively and summarily with the Iranian menace. Saudis, Jordanians, Egyptians, and others—all feel the pinch of an encroaching power. The longer we wait, the harder it will be to stop the Iranian advance.
In 1936, the French army could have halted Hitler’s reoccupation of the Rhineland with a single division of troops, but chose to do nothing. In 1938, Britain and France could have joined forces with the well-armed and highly motivated Czech army to administer a crushing defeat to the German Wehrmacht and probably topple Hitler in the bargain. Instead they handed him the Sudetenland, setting in motion the process that in 1939 led to the most destructive war in world history. Do we intend to dither until suicide bombers blow up a supertanker off the Omani coast, or a mushroom cloud appears over Tel Aviv, before we decide it is finally time to get serious about Iran?
About the Author
Arthur Herman, a new contributor, has taught history at George Mason University and Georgetown University. He is the author of, among other books, The Idea of Decline in Western History, How the Scots Invented the Modern World, and, most recently, To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World (2004), nominated in 2005 for the Mountbatten Prize in naval history. Mr. Herman thanks Chet Nagle and J.R. Dunn for help and advice in the writing of this essay.
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Footnotes
As the impasse over Iran’s nuclear-weapons program grows inexorably into a crisis, a kind of consensus has taken root in the minds of America’s foreign-policy elite. This is that military action against Iran is a sure formula for disaster. The essence of the position was expressed in a cover story in Time magazine this past September. Entitled “What War with Iran Would Look Like (And How to Avoid It),” the essay focused on what the editors saw as the certain consequences of armed American intervention in that country: wildly spiking oil prices, increased terrorist attacks, economic panic around the world, and the end to any dream of pro-American democratic governments emerging in the Middle East. And that would be in the case of successful action. In fact, Time predicted, given our overstretched resources and an indubitably fierce Iranian resistance, we would almost certainly lose.
Thus, in the eyes of Time’s experts as of many other observers, military action against Iran is “unthinkable.” What then can be done in the face of the mullahs’ implacable drive to acquire nuclear weapons? Here a variety of responses can be discerned. At one end are those who assure us, in the soothing title of a New York Times op-ed by Barry Posen of MIT, that “We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran.” (Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria is similarly sanguine.) Others, like Senator Joseph Biden, insist that we have at least ten years before we have to worry about Iran’s getting a working bomb. According to Ashton Carter, who served as an assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, we at least have enough time to explore every possible diplomatic avenue before contemplating any direct military response.
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PJ,
It has to be noticeable to enough Americans that us Cold Warriors were considered evil baby killers in the days our military stared down judeo-bolshevist expansion but the military is today considered acceptable because it fights israel's enemies.
Isn't that the damn truth and David Horowitz is exibit A.
....Even with all the problems they have, they still haven't given up on the insane idea of attacking Iran. Here's another proposal by a Kaganite from Norman Podhoretz's Commentary magazine. I've highlighted the actual plan in bold if you don't wish to wade through all of this crap. I swear, the worst things get over there, the crazier the Neocons become. These people are insane...............
About the Author
Arthur Herman, a new contributor, has taught history at George Mason University and Georgetown University. He is the author of, among other books, To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World (2004), nominated in 2005 for the Mountbatten Prize in naval history...
It sounds so easy, doesn't it? I'm disappointed to see Herman wrote this. I've read several of his books, and really liked the one on the Royal Navy.
Bush may prove more dangerous and destructive the more he feels himself forced into a corner by the elections, Iraq/Afghanistan, Iran, the Israeli lobby, etc. I read the fat little Podhoretz son's column in the NY POST celebrating the Kagan war plan and predicting that Bush's speech announcing its implementation will amount to a "second declaration of war." In my darker moments, I imagine that Bush will announce in the same speech that the attack on Iran is in progress.
I'm really starting to believe that nothing will stop Bush from escalating the war in Iraq and initiating a war on Iran except for Peter Pace and the JCS telling him, "No sir. We can't do it."
Thin reeds, I know.
dubeaux
In an indirect way, the neocon jewsade is actually starting to learn what you've pointed out. They keep mentioning the need for more "boots on the ground", a term I abhor since it's used by so many chickenhawks in a manner similar to "meat on the hoof". (What if I said we needed "more skirts in the workplace" to handle all the paperwork?)
Good point. And I suppose RMA and the hi-tech fetish became too closely associated with Rumsfeld, who, as soon as he proved unable to advance the neocon agenda the way they had hoped, became the mortal enemy of most neocons, Likudniks and Christian Zionists, and whose ideas as well as body had to be expunged.
On a somewhat related note: I watch FoxNews a lot and the dynamic duo of Fred Barnes and Morton Kondracke (gentile neocons, btw) are voicing increasing dissatisfaction with the American people in general for not "being patient with the president," and continuing to support the war.
What a couple of nitwits.
dubeaux
dubeaux,
I suspect another reason for all the hoopla for the RMA was to reward Bush contributors for their support.
I ocassionally watch the B'nai Brith boys. The real name of the show fits to a "T". They deserve to be inside of the beltway where ignorance reigns. I really don't know why Fred even uses "me too" Mort. He could despense with him and it wouldn't affect the overall low quality of the show. Frick and Frack are to be watched for entertainment value only. Someone looking for serious news and opinions is advise to look elsewhere.
Good point. And I suppose RMA and the hi-tech fetish became too closely associated with Rumsfeld, who, as soon as he proved unable to advance the neocon agenda the way they had hoped, became the mortal enemy of most neocons, Likudniks and Christian Zionists, and whose ideas as well as body had to be expunged.
On a somewhat related note: I watch FoxNews a lot and the dynamic duo of Fred Barnes and Morton Kondracke (gentile neocons, btw) are voicing increasing dissatisfaction with the American people in general for not "being patient with the president," and continuing to support the war.
What a couple of nitwits.
dubeaux
Hello dubeaux
At this rate the US will have to start thinking about drafting troops in order to maintain it's present level of international deployments. :rolleyes:
The American people here lead to believe a quick and easy victory would be brought about in Iraq. Which is why defeat in Iraq will almost certainly undermind the entire American political establishment. Sending more troops to Iraq at this point will only compound this administrations mistake in sending them there in the first place.
Further more, this war has cost the US tax payer $140 billion so far this year. Which is all money down the drain and increasing your deployment will only add to this expense. In the mean while the country is unsurprisingly entering a recession and it's international reputation and trading relations have been seriously undermined.
The wests relations with nations such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey are being jeopardised. These nations are all consurned about the wider regional security implications of this war. Riyadh is funding the Sunni insurgency in Iraq and Saudi Arabia is fighting a proxy war with Iran and they aren't going to simply role over and hand Iraq to Iran on a silver platter.
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